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25. Id. at 1519, n.616.
26. Id.
27. Loren v. Air Illinois,
Inc., 163 III. App. 3d 1060,
522 N.E2d 1352 (1988); Excharge Nat'i Bank v. Air lliApp. 3d
nois, Inc., 167 111.
1081, 522 NhE.2d 146 (1988)
Singh v. Air Illinois, Inc., 16!
IlL A-p. 3d 923,520 N.E.2d
852 (. S).
28. See, e.g.. Cornejo v.
State of Washington, 57

Wash. App. 314,788 P.2d 554
(1990); Scott v. United States,
884 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1989);
Thompson v. Camp, 163 F.2d
396 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. de.
n d, 333 U.S. 831 (1948).
29. "Hearsay" is a statemcnt, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at trirl or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. Fed. R.
Evid. 801(c).
30. Rule 703 provides that
"(tjhe facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those per.
ceived by or made known to
the expert at or before the

hezring. If ofa type resonably
relied upon by experts in the
particular field In forming
opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data
need nrt be admissible in evidence."
31. For example, In Cor-

nejo v. Washington, 57 Wash.
App. 314, 78, P.2d 554

(1990), testimony concerning
the cost of an annuity that
would provide the plaintiff
with a guaranteed stream of
income was challenged as
hearsay. The court, relying on
Washington's analog to Rule
703 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, found this evidence
to be admissible. The court
observed that "the costs of
annuities, obtained, s here,
In price quotations from Insurance companies, surely
are facts that would be used
generally by economists and
financial planners in many
contexts." ld. at 560. The
cort also noted that annuities are often used in a variety

of legal contexts such as the
formulation of structured set.
tlements. Id.

Choosing Federal Court for
Determination of
State Law Questions:
When and Why

balance in favor of one
forum over the other. A
plaintiff's attorney may
consider these fawtors In
deciding where to file suit,
while a defendent's attorney may consider the same
factors in deciding whether
to seek removal of a state

court action to federal
court.
There is supposed to be
no difference, however, in
the substantive law applied
in the federal and state
court and, therefore, no
occasion to choose between them on the basis of
which court will apply
more favorable substantive
law. That Is the ostensible
lesscn-O EriC R. R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 US. 64, 82
L Ed. 1188, 58 S. Ct 817
(1938), in which the United
States Supreme Court declared that federal judges
hearing diversity cases
must apply state substinrive law to determine the
m rits. The law applied in
fdieral and state court is
not always the same, however, and the possibility
that federal judges might
construe state law differently from their state counterparts should factor into
the decision whether to
sue in state or federal

court or remove a state

W
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court action to federal
an attorney
a en
choice
betweenhas

state and federal court in
which to litigate a cause of
action, what factors should
Influence the choice of
forum? Differences between the court, systems
usually dictate the choice.
Comparative docket
congestion, perceptions
concerning the relative
quality of the judiciary or
even the convenience of
the physical facilities of the
courthouse might tilt the

courtL
The "Erie Guess"
Erie reduced, but did not
eliminate, the possibility
that federal courts might
apply different substantive
law than a state court. Under Eric federal judges
confronted with uncertainty as to a state's substantive layw are to make
an "Erie guess" as to what
the law of the state is. The
federal judge's determina-

&A

tion of state law is not always the same as that of
state court judges. The federal district court judge
might have more flexibility
in deciding an issue than a
state trial judge; the federal
judge might be more indined toward a liberal or
conservative construction
of the law than his or her

..

. it is

appropriate to
explore the
possibility that
the federal court
might construe
state law more
favorably to your
.client than would
the state court.

state counterpart; and the
federal judge's ruling will
be reviewed by the fderal
court of appeals whose
members might well have
judicial philosophies different than those of the members of the equivalent state
appellate court.
In an attempt to further
narrow the gap between
federal and state court
interpretations of state law,
more than thirty-five states
have adopted certification
statutes. These statutes allow federal judges faced
with ambiguous state law
to request the state supreme court to declare the
applicable law so that the
feder-J judge may get a definitive ruling rather than
make an "Erie guess."
Certification statutes would
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seem to assure that state
and federal courts will apply the same state law, and
thus to negate the possibility of differences in state
law construction as a basis
for choosing one forum
over another. For several
reasons, however, an attorney choosing between state
and federal forums might
still prefer the federal
forum for resolution of
ambiguous state law.
What follows is an outline of the factors an attorney should consider in
choosing between federal
and state court for resolution of disputes to which
state substantive law applies.
I. Determine IT the
Federal Court Has Jursdiction to Decide the
State Law Claim The first
task in forum selection is
to determine whether the
federal forum is available
as an alternative to state
court fur resolution of-the
state law claim. Usually
this requires determining
whether there is diversity
jurisdiction-the parties on
either side must each be
citizens of states different
than the parties on the
other side and the amount
in controversy must exceed $50,000. If diversity
jurisdiction does not exist,
check to see if there is a
federal claim which invokes federal question jurisdiction and whether the
state claim qualifies for
pendent jurisdiction status,
i.e., does the claim arise
from the same nucleus of
operative facts as the federal claim-and form a convenient triai unit with the
federal claim? See United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 725, 16 L Ed. 2d
218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966).
Pendent jurisdiction nc-
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mally applies to permit
joinder of a state claim
against a non-diverse defendant who is defending a
claim based on federal
law. Under certain circumstances, pendent jurisdiction can also be used to
join additional non-diverse
defendants in a lawsuit
when one defendant is
sued on a federal claim. In
1989, the United States Su-

...the

U.S.
Supreme- Court
ruled that it is
error for a
federal court of
appeals to defer
to the trial
judge's "Erie
guess."
preme Court sharply curtailed the power of the
federal courts to use this
doctrine of "pendent
party" jurisdiction, Finley
v. United States, 490 U.S.
545, 104 L Ed. 2d 593, 109
S. Ct. 2003 (1989), but
Congress recently expressly authorized federal
"pendent party" jurisdiction in many cases where
the state claims against additional non-diverse parties
are "so related to claims in
the action within such
original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same
case or controversy under
Article III of the United
States Constitution." Judicial Improvements Act of
1990, Pub. L No. 101-650,
Sec. 310, 104 Stat. 5113,
5114 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1367).
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If both tle federal and
state courts have jurisdiction over the state law
claim, it is appropriate to
explore the possibility that
the federal court might
construe state law more favorably to your client than
would the state court.
IL Consider Whether
the State Law Is Suffi.
ciently Unclear as to Require Interpretation by
the Tr-al Court Judge In
Federal Court. It is the
presence of ambiguity or
uncertainty in the state law
that presents the opportunity for a federal "Erie
guess" that nay differ from
the construction given to
state law by state trial
court judges. If the state
supreme court has recently
decided the state law issue,
there is little room for a
federal judge to make an
"Erie guess" different than
the interpretation that the
state trial judge would apply and thus, no reason to
choose federal court in the
hope of receiving a more
favorable interpretation of
state law. So, too, if the
state supreme court precedent is old but unchallenged, the federal judge
will follow the precedent
"if there is no confusion in
the decisions, no developing line of authorities that
casts a doubt over the established ones, no dicta,
d bubts or ambiguities...
J&rnhardtv. Polygraphic
6o. of America, Inc., 350
U.S. 198, 205, 100 L Ed.
199, 76 S. Ct. 273 (1956).
The same result is likely
where the state supreme
court has not spoken, but
the state's intermediate appellate court has ruled and
there is no indication that
the state supreme court
would rule differently. Fi-

delity Union Trust Co. v.
Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177-78,
85 L Ed. 109, 61 S. Ct. 176
(1940).
As the state precedent
becomes more murky,
there is a greater possibility that a federal court will
construe state law differently than would a state
trial judge. Where contradictory decisions of different divisions of the
intermediate appellate
court exist, for example,
the federal judge has considerable flexibility in deciding state law. See
Yonover, "Ascertaining
State Law: The Continuing
Erie Dilemma," 38 De Paul
L. Rev. 1 (1989). Where
there is unreversed authority from an appellate court
but a developing line of authorities, dicta or ambiguities casts doubt on the
continuing validity of the
precedent, a federil judge
might decide that the precedent need not be followed. See Bernhardtv.
Polygraphic Co. of America,
Inc., 350 U.S. at 205
(1956). If only trial court
rulings exist, there is also
considerable room for the
federal judge to reach an
independent decision as to
the status of state law. See
IA Part 2, Moore's Federal
Practice1 0.307(2] (2d ed.
1978).
Where there is no precedent interpreting state law,
the federal judge must seek
to construe the law in the
manner which the state supreme court would if faced
with the same issue and
must consider all sources,
including related state
court precedent, federal
decisions and the gen 'ral
weight and trend of authority nationally. See, e.g.,
Hartfordv. Gibbons & Reed

I

I I

I

I i

I

Co., 617 F.2d 567, 569

bound by these strictures

(10th Cir. 1980). The opportunity for creative law
construction by the federal
judge thus often exists. As
Professor Charles Alan
Wright notes, the federal
judge "need no longei be a
ventriloquist's di 4im'1 Instead he Is free, just a his

and thus have more flexibility than C- state trial
courts to antic"nate

state counterpart is, t

consider all the data the
highest court of the state
would use in an effort to
determine how the highest
court of the state would
decide." Wright, Federal
Courts, 373 (4th ed. 1983).
IlL Consider Whether

an 'Edrie Guess" Is Likely
to Benefit Your Client. At
one level, guesswork and

instinct rather than reasoned analysis must guide.
you in deciding whether a
federal judge is more or
less likely than a state
judge to rule favorably on
an open question of state
law. This is especially so
before the case has been
filed and assigned to a particular judge for handling.
There are, however, measurable considerations
which may guide the
choice. In many states,
trial judges must follow
unreversed supreme court
decisions even though the
precedent might be ripe
for reconsideration. So,
too, state intermediate appellate courts sometimes
must blindly follow even
outdated precedefit of the
state supreme court. Thus,
a change in law in state
court may come only at
the appellate level and
only if the state supreme

court exercises its discretion to review lower court
rulings which follow existing precedent. Federal district court judges making
an "Erie guess" are not
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In the past. feLeral
courts of appeal usually
gave great deference to the
"Erie guess" of district
court judg-s, The resulting
unlikelihood of reversal on
appeal of the district-court
judge's "Erie guess" was a
disincentive to protracted
appeals in the federal system. For th!s reason, the
litigant who wished to
change existing law without time-consuming appeals sometimes preferred
the federal fdnrm.
A recent decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court makes
such thinking anachronistic. In Salve Regina College
v. Russell, 59 U.S.LW.
4219 (U.S. March 20,
(listing of states with certification procedures).
1991), the U.S. Supreme
Where a certification
Court ruled that it is error
for a federal court of approcedure is available and
used, a litigant will not atpeals to defer to the trial
tain the benefit of a federal
judge's "Erie guess." Instead, the principles under- judge's construction of
state law. The availability
lying Erie "require that
courts of appeal review the. of a certification statute
state-law determinations of does not mean thairit must
district courts de novo." Id. be used, however. The
certification statutes of sevat 4223. The change to de
novo appellate review undoubtedly will encourage

Furthermore, certification statutes permit but do
not compel federal judges
to seek rulings of the state
supreme court. The federal
court has discretion to decline to use the certification process and instead to
make an "Erie guess." Armijo v. Ex Camn, Inc., 843
F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir.
1988). The federal court
should not routinely use
the certification procedure
to avoid its duty to determine all issues presented
to it, Shakopee Mdewakan.
ton Sioux Community v.
City of Prior Lake, 771 F.2d
1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011
(1986), but should apply
for certification when the
federal court finds itself
genuinely uncertain about
a question of state law that
is vital to the correct disposition of the case. Tidier
v. Eli Lilly and Co., 851
F.2d 418, 426 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
Even when the federal
trial judge chooses to make
use of an available qcrtification statute, there is no
guarantee that the state
court will accept the tendered certification. Statutory prerequisites often
exist and the state supreme

appeals by parties who are

court may conclude that

changes in state law.

dissatisfied with the "Eri,
guess" of the federal district court judge. Litigants
seeking a speedy and relatively inexpensive resolution of state law questions
will no longer be attracted
to federal court by the
hope that the district
court's construction of
state law Is unlikely to engender an appeal.
IV. Determine Whether
the Federal Court Will
Avoid the 'Erie Guess"
by Use ofa State Certfi.

cation Statute. A federal
court may not decline to

I

exercise jurisdiction
merely because it must resolve a difficult question of
state law. Meredith v. City
of Winterhaven, 320 U.S.
228, 234, 88 L Ed. 9, 64 S.
Ct. 7 (1943). But an increasing number of states
provide a mechanism by
which federal judges can
avoid making a difficult
"Erie guess." More than
thirty-five states have enacted certification statutes
which allow federal judges
to present difficult questions of state law directly
to the supreme court of
the state for resolution so
that the federal judge need
not make an "Erie guess."
See Yonover, "Ascertaining State Layr. The Continuing Erie Dilemma," supra

The availability of
a certification
statute does not
mean that it
must be used,
however.
eral states provide that
only federal appellate
courts and not district
courts may certify questions to the state supreme
court. Id.

the federal court erred in
determining that the prerequisites were met. See
e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. Sec.
34-2.8(A) (1990 Repl.
Pamp.) (certified issue
must be determinative).
State supreme courts
may have discretion to decline the proposed certification even if the
requirements for certification are met. The New
Mexico supreme court, for
example, limits acceptance
of certification requests "to
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those cases in which there
is no dispute over the factual predicates to the
court's determination of
the questions certified, and
[the court's] answer either
disposes of the entire case

If discretionary
review of the
intermediate
state appellate
court is sought,
the state
supreme court
might deny
review.
or controversy...or disposes
of a pivotal issue that defines the future course of
the case." Schlieter v. Carlos, 108 N.M. 507, 508-09,
775 P.2d 709, 710-1f
(1989). The court in
Schlieter also expressed a
preference for certified
questions which present a
significant question of law
under the state constitution or an issue of substantial public interest. Id. at
511,775 P.2d at 713.
Obviously, the presence
of a certification statute increases the likelihood that
a litigant will not get the
benefit of an "Erie guess"
from a federal judge. There
is ample opporkunity, however, to convince the federal court not to seek certification or to persuade the
state court not to accept a
tendered certification
when the requirements for
certification are not met or
there exist persuasive arguments that the federal or

48

state court should decline
to use this discretionary
procedure.
Even in those instances
when the federal court
certifies a state law question and the state supreme
court accepts the certification, the litigants might receive a ruling on state law
different than that which
they would have gotten in
the state trial court. State
trdal court judges might be
bound by state law to apply precedent from their
state supreme court until
it is reversed, even if the
precedent is outdated and
ripe for reversil, Those
rulings migh never get reviewed by the state supreme court because
appeals of right may go
only to an intermediate
appellate court which also
may be bound to follow
even outdated precedent
from the state supreme
court. If discretionary review of the Intermediate
state appellate court is
sought, the state.supreme
court might deny review.
In contrast, successftl

vorable interpretation of
state law in federal court
will be an important and
possibly determinative factor in choosing a federal
court for the resolution of
claims based upon state
law. The possibility of a favorable "Erie guess" will
occasionally outweigh
some of the other factors
which are generally considered in the choicebetween federal and state
court and, therefore, litigants should consider this
factor when ,oosing be-

the federal court will have

access to the state supreme court and will apply the current state law
rather than outdated precedents or Incorrect con-

Jane L Dolkart

structions of ambiguous or

Conclusion
The combined effect of
Erie and proliferating certification statutes is to diminish, but not eliminate,
the advantage that a litigant might gain from having a feder',l Judge, rather
than a state court, construe
state law. There continue
to be cases in which the
opportunity for a more fa-
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Summary Judgment In the
Federal Courts after the
Supreme Court Trilogy

certification assures that

contradictory case law.

tween state and federal
courts.

0

ver the past decade
the so-called litigation
explosion and the docket
preiures it has placed on
the federal judiciary have
led to substantial changes
in federal procedure aimed
at increasing court efficiency and weeding out
unmeritorious cases prior
to trial Thus, the 1983
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted broader use

of sanctions for discovery
abuse and comprehensive
manage.jent of cases by
the federal judiciary. At the
same time, there has been
a perceptible return to fact
pleading and resort to alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms by the cotirt,
all In an effort to control
overburdened dockets.
In 1986, the Supreme
Court added summary
iudgment to its list of
weapons to turn back the
litigation tide. In a trilogy
of cases, MatsushitaElectric IndustrialCo. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

189 L Ed. 2d 538, 106 S.
Ct. 1348 (1986), Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 91 L Ed. 2d 202,
106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986), and
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 191 L Ed. 2d 265 106
S. CL 2548 (1935), the Supreme Court reformulated
summary judgment doctrine and practice. This ar-

